Christian humanism, progressive Christianity and social transformation by De Gruchy, John
  
 
Journal for the Study of Religion 31,1 (2018) 54 – 69        54  
On-line ISSN 2413-3027; DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2413-3027/2018/v31n1a3   
 
 
Christian Humanism, Progressive Christianity,  
and Social Transformation 
 
 
John de Gruchy  
john@degruchy.co.za 
 
 
 
Abstract  
This article explores my understanding of Christian humanism in conversation 
with Martin Prozesky’s notion of progressive Christianity and their relevance 
for social transformation. Central to the conversation is how we understand the 
role of creeds and confessions in Christian faith, and the significance of the 
confession that Jesus, the truly human one, is the Christ of faith. This leads me 
into a discussion on the Incarnation as the foundation for Christian humanism, 
and Eucharistic community as the embodiment and agent of social 
transformation. 
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Martin Prozesky and I trained as theologians in preparation for ordination to 
the ministry of the church, but both of us eventually taught in university 
Departments of Religion. During that period we co-edited two volumes: A 
Southern African Guide to World Religions (1991), and Living Faiths in South 
Africa (1995), which continue to be used as textbooks. Since those days, now 
so much in the past, we have each journeyed along intellectual and personal 
paths that have intersected and diverged. I have always respected Martin’s 
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scholarship and the integrity of his convictions, and am delighted that I can 
now contribute to this Festschrift in his honour. What follows, picks up on an 
all too brief a conversation we had about Christian humanism some years ago, 
taking it further in pursuit of an understanding of Christian faith that can be 
affirmed with integrity for the sake of a more humane world. 
Martin and I have much in common, not least the conviction that 
progressive religion has a critical role to play in the struggle for a more just 
society in South Africa. I have no doubt that Martin and I also share the 
conviction that being Christian in any meaningful sense requires a commitment 
to the integrity of life and human flourishing expressed through love, justice 
and beauty. We may differ on how this is theologically justified and we may 
use a different vocabulary in doing so, not least because of the sources we draw 
on and the mentors that have influenced our theological development. But this 
does not set us apart in vision and practice, on the contrary it requires that we 
both show an openness to and a solidarity with people of other faiths, or none 
at all, who share our concern for the well-being of humanity and the planet. So 
I think that we are probably closer to each other than apart, and perhaps more 
so now as time moves on. Yet, I suspect that we are still not theologically 
entirely on the same page. For that reason the focus of my essay is on my 
understanding of the theological basis for Christian humanism and how this 
might relate to Martin’s ‘progressive Christianity’ and the task at hand. 
 My understanding of Christian humanism has been enriched by the 
work of two friends and colleagues: William Schweiker, Distinguished Service 
Professor of Theological Ethics at the University of Chicago1, and Jens 
Zimmermann, Canada Research Chair of Interpretation, Religion and Culture 
and Professor of English and modern languages at Trinity Western University 
in British Columbia2. The influence of Dietrich Bonhoeffer on my thinking 
will also be apparent in what follows3. My own foray into the subject can be 
found chiefly in my books Being Human: Confessions of a Christian 
Humanist; Led into Mystery; and The Humanist Imperative in South Africa (de 
Gruchy 2006; 2011b; and 2011c).  
                                                          
1 See Klemm and Schweiker (2008); Schweiker (2010); and Schweiker (2008: 
100-115). 
2 See Zimmermann (2012a); and Zimmermann (2012b).  
3 See especially the two sections on ‘History and the Good’ in Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer’s, Ethics (2005: 219-298. See also de Gruchy (2011a).  
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I Christian Humanism, Progressive Christianity and 
Christology 
Christian humanism is, for some, an oxymoron for the simple reason that 
humanism today generally refers to its secular variety, and Christianity has 
long been regarded as its antagonist. There is truth in that assessment, but it 
does not take into account the varieties of Christianity, sometimes represented 
by different denominations but often transcending institutional boundaries, 
hence such appellations as liberal, conservative or progressive. So to use the 
terms ‘Christian’ or ‘Christianity’ meaningfully requires clarification. The 
same is true of ‘humanism’ given its complex genealogy in the West from 
classical culture through the development of Christianity until it morphed into 
post-Enlightenment secular humanism and a variety of contemporary neo-
humanisms. Today, some historic forms of humanism smack of an anthropo-
centrism that is problematic given our current understanding of ourselves in 
relation to the biosphere and cosmos.  
 Martin describes himself as a progressive Christian, a description to 
which I immediately warm even though I do not know precisely what he means 
and, in a sense, must make certain assumptions that may not be entirely 
accurate. I assume, for example, that by progressive he is saying that his 
understanding of Christianity is socially and politically transformative, not 
reactionary. But what, then, about his theological understanding of 
Christianity? About this, I assume that a clue can be gleaned from recent 
correspondence in which he said that he did not regard central Christian 
doctrines as literally true or doing justice to what Jesus was primarily about, 
and described himself not as post-Christian, but as ‘post-credal and post-
ecclesiastical’. He also mentioned that he was attracted to Ninian Smart’s term 
‘transcendental humanism’, but not understood in a dualistic conventional, 
literal, theistic way4. These comments must suffice to get my conversation with 
him going, though what they convey to me may not be precisely what they 
mean for Martin. After all, the prefix ‘post’ seldom signifies a simple shift from 
one position to another as is evident when we speak of ‘post-modernism’ or 
‘post-modernity’. Paradigm shifts are a critical suspension and transformative 
                                                          
4 See Prozesky’s forthcoming book Honest to Goodness, and ‘Ethics, 
Spirituality and the Secular’ in Secular Spirituality as a Contextual Critique of 
Religion, edited by du Toit and Mayson (2006: 127-138).  
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retrieval of tradition. So what do ‘post-credal’, ‘post-ecclesiastical’ and 
‘transcendental humanism’ convey to me, and would I describe my Christian 
humanism in similar terms?  
During the struggle against apartheid, Martin and I were constantly 
aware that our concern for justice, too often denied by fellow white Christians, 
was shared by people of other faiths as well as by secular humanists even 
though they did not share the same Christian beliefs and commitments. We 
were united in our affirmation of human dignity and, at the same time, divided 
from many of our co-religionists who remained silent or gave their support to 
apartheid. This alliance with others in the struggle irrespective of faith 
commitment was strategic, yet it was also, at least from a Christian perspective, 
one that was theologically derived. As Bonhoeffer indicates in his Ethics, the 
dividing line established by Jesus was not primarily between his disciples and 
others, but between those who, whether in his name or not, struggled against 
dehumanizing and idolatrous powers in solidarity with the oppressed, alienated 
and downtrodden. For Bonhoeffer this gave decisive substance to the faith-
claim that ‘God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself’ (Bonhoeffer 
2005: 82), which, I suggest, is fundamental to Christianity, a matter to which I 
will shortly return. 
Long before 9/11 and the stark lines drawn by the exponents of the 
badly conceived and described culture war between the Christian West and 
Islam, Martin and I had transgressed such boundaries of exclusion. Since those 
tragic and terrifying events and their consequences, which characterize much 
of our current global reality, our common dislike of imperial and triumphalist 
Christianity has been reinforced. As I understand Martin’s position, this is part 
of what is implied by his choice of the term ‘progressive’ to qualify his 
Christianity. In my own case I chose to distance myself from these idolatries 
by calling myself a Christian humanist. But neither of us identify with those 
forms of Christianity (or any religion for that matter) that are reactionary and 
right-wing in orientation. I think I can also safely say that we reject all forms 
of fundamentalism including scientism and secularism, any humanism that is 
a closed anthropocentric system incapable of criticism and transformation, all 
forms of ecclesiastical and religious triumphalism, and denominational secta-
rianism, and rejoice whenever we experience the church as an inclusive and 
progressive community of concerned and compassionate fellow-believers. In 
short, for us, being Christian means to be truly human rather than being 
religious in any narrow sense of that word; it also means striving to become 
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more fully human in solidarity with the rest of humankind in the struggle for a 
more humane, just and peaceable world that respects human dignity and 
freedom, as well as the integrity of creation. I am a humanist because I am a 
Christian, and as a Christian I seek to be the best humanist I can be, and I know 
that Martin would agree. 
 But what about Martin’s use of the terms ‘post-credal’, ‘post-
ecclesiastical’, and ‘transcendental humanism?’ Let me begin with ‘post-
credal’. Does this mean that we hold to no beliefs, that there is nothing of 
substance to which we can append our ‘credo’? Put so crassly, that is surely 
not what Martin means. But if, as I think most likely, it means moving beyond 
the classical Christian creeds, does it mean a rejection of everything they 
generally affirm, not just their form and structure, but also their substance? I 
don’t actually know how Martin would respond to that, but I assume, once 
again, that he would be more nuanced than his words superficially suggest. 
However, instead of second-guessing him, I would like to clarify my own 
position in order to take our conversation further.  
 In my own ecclesial tradition (Congregational) creeds are not normally 
part of the liturgy, and forced subscription to them has always been strenuously 
resisted. We have not been called ‘Nonconformists’ for nothing! Maybe that 
means that already, since the seventeenth century, my own tradition was post-
credal. This does not mean we were creedless, for we affirmed various 
Reformed confessions of faith, and continue to acknowledge the historical, 
theological and ecumenical importance of the historic creeds even though they 
do not normally feature in our liturgies. They are important because they keep 
us in conversation with historical Christianity. But we insist that their 
contextual character does not bind us to past understandings of Christian faith. 
I am sure that many Christians in other traditions where the creeds are more 
central would agree with that position.  
 There are, after all, faithful church members, ministers and priests who 
dutifully say the creeds, but who have serious reservations about some of their 
assertions taken literally even though they may appear to affirm them as though 
they do. This means that a degree of dishonesty can intrude the liturgy 
undermining the doxological character of the creeds and the integrity of the 
worshippers. I fear this often results from the ineptitude of priests and ministers 
in helping people understand the Bible hermeneutically, long before they get 
round to explaining the creeds and the reasons why they are embedded in the 
liturgy. Apart from any lack of training in this regard, this failure often arises 
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from a fear of being censured, or by an unwillingness to upset those who do 
take the creeds literally. But the fact that people in the pews who recite the 
creeds week by week assume that it is all meant to be understood literally, 
while many theologians and clergy understand them differently, seems to me 
a sad, dishonest and counterproductive state of affairs. 
 The classical creeds emerged in the Patristic struggle against what was 
perceived to be heresy. Those who drafted them sought to draw boundaries 
between true and false belief in the contest between contending interpretations 
of the significance of Jesus as the Jewish Messiah and ‘incarnate Son of God’. 
Irrespective of how they were understood then or the purposes to which they 
were sometimes put, they became doxological expressions that encapsulated 
the mysteries of Christian faith in the language of both history and myth. If 
myth is properly understood, I have no problem with the formulation ‘the myth 
of God Incarnate’ made infamous by John Hick, though the term is as James 
Dunn suggests, inappropriate in early Christology (Dunn 1980: 262). What is 
appropriate is C.S. Lewis’ assertion that in the Jesus narrative myth became 
fact without losing its mythical character, something that Bonhoeffer also 
said5. Christianity expresses itself in the language of myth as much as it does 
in the language of history, and the two merge in the creeds which encapsulate 
the Christian mythos as understood in its early genesis. 
 The original meaning of mythos as narrative or story is the product of 
human imagination. So we can speak of the Christian mythos in the same way 
as we might talk about an historical novel, though the analogy is not perfect 
(Jennings 1976:9). The Christian mythos is that in Jesus of Nazareth, God 
became truly human in order that we might become fully human in the image 
of God. This is the theological basis for Christian humanism, as Zimmermann 
has thoroughly articulated in his Incarnational Humanism. But as he tells us, 
something that I too affirm, we are not seeking ‘to invent something new but 
rather to retrieve an ancient Christian humanism for our time in response to the 
general demand for a common humanity beyond religious, denominational, 
and secular divides’. Yet, both he and I also assert, that ‘orthodox Christology 
provides the most promising source for a common vision of a truly human 
society’ (Zimmermann 2012b: 10). This does not mean that what is often taken 
for ‘orthodoxy’ has always got it right when it comes to a praxis that is faithful 
to its Christological source. But if not, what can it mean? 
                                                          
5 See my discussion in Led into Mystery (de Gruchy 2011b: 76-81). 
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 As someone who spoke and wrote about the theological justification 
of apartheid as a heresy, I obviously recognize that there come moments in 
history when the boundaries that define what it means to be Christian and the 
church of Jesus Christ have to be drawn. My understanding of the church as an 
inclusive community is contingent precisely on the rejection of false 
boundaries determined by ethnicity, gender, class or sexual orientation. I am 
not suggesting that this is the ‘orthodox’ way to understand the classical creeds, 
but I am saying that there are boundaries that determine the character of the 
church even if there is disagreement as to where and when those boundaries 
are to be drawn. This was the problem which confronted Bonhoeffer in 
responding to the German Christians who supported Hitler and promoted the 
Nazification of the Protestant Church. Both sides in the Kirchenkampf recited 
the creeds and affirmed the Lutheran confessions, but Bonhoeffer understood 
them hermeneutically not literally, christologically and not ideologically. 
There may have been consensus on, for example, the ‘two natures of Christ’ 
but there was clearly disagreement on who Jesus Christ was for them at that 
historical juncture6. The Barmen Declaration was a confessional response to 
that question within that historical context and, as such, assumed credal 
significance if not status. 
 Although Bonhoeffer’s own response to his question ‘who is Jesus 
Christ for us today’ was hermeneutically located within that context, it was 
undoubtedly in continuity with the ancient creeds, despite the influence of his 
great liberal teacher Adolf von Harnack, for whom they were highly 
problematic. For Harnack, following Jesus rather than believing in the ‘Christ 
of the creeds’ was the essence of Christianity (von Harnack 1986: 146-149). In 
taking this position, Harnack rightly maintained that discipleship is not the 
same as believing in a doctrine about Jesus as the Christ. Yet contrasting 
discipleship and believing in a doctrine in this way is surely a category mistake. 
Discipleship and faith as commitment to Jesus as Lord belong together, as 
Bonhoeffer expressed so powerfully in Discipleship (Bonhoeffer 2001: 63). 
Harnack’s problem, as Rudolf Bultmann said, was that he did ‘not clearly see 
the difference between the kerygmatic character of the Gospel and an 
‘Enlightenment doctrine or an ethical appeal’ (von Harnack 1986: xv). Jesus 
became the timeless truth about God and eternity, about the human soul and 
                                                          
6 See the notes on Bonhoeffer’s lectures on Christology in Berlin in 1933, in 
Bonhoeffer (2009: 299-360). 
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the good life, rather than the witness to God’s coming kingdom amidst the 
historical and political realities of his day.  
 It is true that many seek to follow Jesus without accepting the claim 
that he is the Christ of Christian faith, but it seems to me that faith in Jesus as 
‘the Christ’ is fundamental to being Christian. I am not saying that there is no 
‘Jesus before Christianity’, as Albert Nolan portrayed in his book of that title, 
nor am I saying that Jesus only has significance within Christianity, for Jesus 
was not a Christian; nor am I saying that you have to be a Christian to follow 
Jesus, or that many who follow Jesus do not do so much better than many 
Christians. What I am saying is that Christianity as it evolved already in the 
apostolic period was Christological not Jesu-logical, and that the doctrine of 
the Incarnation was already implicit. To my mind, no one has explored this 
development more fully than Dunn whose conclusion is that while we ‘cannot 
claim that Jesus believed himself to be the incarnate Son of God’, we can say 
that this conviction was ‘an appropriate reflection on and elaboration of Jesus’ 
own sense of sonship and eschatological mission’ (Dunn 1980: 254). 
 In sum, we cannot delete the doctrine of the Incarnation from 
Christianity without destroying its integrity as Christian faith. Having said that, 
I would equally say that to believe that ‘God was in Christ’ is not the same as 
believing in the doctrine as doctrine. It is, rather, as Bonhoeffer wrote in his 
Ethics (in continuity with what he said in Discipleship but put differently), 
becoming ‘conformed to the Incarnate One’. And this is fundamental to 
Christian humanism. ‘To be conformed to the one who has become human – 
that is what being human really means’ (Bonhoeffer 2005: 94). In fact, 
nowhere to my knowledge have the humanist ethical implications of the 
Incarnation been so well expressed as in this section of the Ethics where, inter 
alia, Bonhoeffer writes: ‘The message of God’s becoming human attacks at 
the heart of an era when contempt for humanity or idolization of humanity is 
the height of wisdom, among bad people as well as good’ (Bonhoeffer 2005: 
85). To stress the point, I am not talking about believing in a doctrine, but about 
life being shaped by the reality to which that doctrine points. For Bonhoeffer 
this was fundamental to following Jesus and therefore to the Christian mythos. 
And, of course, the same applied to being conformed to the ‘crucified One’ and 
the ‘risen One’, that is, living in solidarity with the suffering and struggles of 
the world, and living and acting in hope of new life and the just transformation 
of present reality. 
Christian humanism, as I understand it, then, is founded on a ‘high 
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Christology’ shaped by a reading of the gospel mythos, but kenotic, not 
triumphalist in character. By this I mean that when we confess Jesus Christ as 
‘truly God’ we are saying that the God in whom we believe has been revealed 
in history as the one who, for us, is most truly human. Too often Christians 
turn this around so that their definitions of God (all-powerful, all-knowing, 
etc.) are applied to Jesus and lead to triumphalist claims on the part of the 
church. Of course, to say Jesus is the ‘truly human One’ is a confession of faith 
that arises out of a reading of the Christian tradition, even though it begs many 
questions. For example, in what sense is Jesus to be regarded as such? Is Jesus 
the only truly human One? Are the rest of us humans not truly human and, if 
not, are we less than human? How then are we to define being human, and 
being more truly so? Discussion of these requires another lengthy conversation 
which is beyond the scope of this essay, but some hints as to how that may 
develop must be given here. 
What I have said thus far is about the basis for Christian humanism, 
something premised on a faith claim. As such it is alien to people of other faiths 
and secular humanists even though there may be agreement on the importance 
of its outcomes and acceptance of the need for such a theological strategy. But 
it is precisely at this point that Schweiker focuses his critique and challenge to 
my approach. Without denying the importance of historical traditions or 
Christian confession, he rightly wants theological humanism to be ‘tested in 
the unending work of interpretation and rumination aimed at understanding’. 
This is necessary if we are to avoid a triumphalism – even in the name of 
humanity – that reduces ‘the other’ to the status of junior partner in the 
humanist endeavour. In fact it requires a theological humanism fashioned in 
dialogue and solidarity with those who come to similar conclusions yet from a 
different perspective. And that, in turn, may require of us a new, liberating 
language in which to express our faith in Christ, as Bonhoeffer anticipated. I 
agree. This does not mean ditching the fundamental premise of Christianity, 
otherwise there is no specifically Christian contribution to the discussion. But 
if my confessional Christian humanism is, at one level, affirmed by Schweiker, 
at another he prompts me to go further for the sake of a broader theological 
humanism in which the integrity of life becomes the key affirmation. 
What, then, needs to be considered as we take the Christian humanist 
or theological neo-humanist project further? A priority must surely be to 
engage with humanists of other traditions in clarifying both areas of agreement 
and disagreement and thus, together with them, set an agenda for further 
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discussion and engagement as we did in the New Humanist project at STIAS 
(Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Studies) in which Schweiker participated 
(de Gruchy 2011c). This requires those of us who are Christians to explore in 
greater depth the theological foundations of our own faith claims and 
perspectives. But it will also help us understand better what resources we bring 
to the table as Christians who seek to be humanists, and as humanists who seek 
to be Christian. So now, within the parameters of this essay, I want to explore 
further, with Zimmermann, the genealogy of a genuinely Christian humanism, 
and its potential for the renewal of culture and the common good, and in doing 
so reflect a little on the significance of the church. Apart from sharing in a 
common task, what do we bring to the dialogue table? 
 
II Christian Humanism, the New Humanity & Social 
Transformation 
Zimmermann’s premise is that Western secularism is exhausted, having lost its 
roots in the religious tradition that gave birth to secularity and modernity. The 
resultant vacuum has been filled by the resurgence of religion, chiefly in 
fundamentalist forms. The consequences are serious and potentially disastrous, 
especially given the fact that the West is increasingly culturally plural in 
character due to the influx of many immigrants for whom secularism is alien, 
humanism threatening and Christianity problematic. At the same time, for 
many secularists, religion has not only lost whatever significance it might have 
had and become the prime target of rebuttal, the enemy of humanism, and the 
cause of social conflict. This is undoubtedly true of some forms of religion, but 
not true of all religion. On the contrary, religion, including Christianity, is 
historically and remains potentially a source of humanism. Examining the 
Christian humanist tradition is, therefore, an ‘essential hermeneutical task’ in 
making possible the renewal of Western culture and ‘integrating other 
religiously formed cultures into Western societies’ (Zimmermann 2012b: 3). 
Zimmermann’s agenda is focused specifically on the West; Prozesky and I are 
more global in interest and specifically concerned about South Africa. But we 
all share the same concern for the recovery and building of humane values that 
enable the flourishing of life in building societies and nations, and the role of 
Christianity as one significant agent in doing so.  
 A preliminary question which must be brought to the fore is whether 
and to what extent Zimmermann’s analysis and prognosis relates meaningfully 
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to our South African context. This was part of the rationale for my initiation of 
and participation in the project at STIAS in 2009-2010 which eventually led to 
the publication of The Humanist Imperative in South Africa to which I 
previously referred. Two factors suggest that there is a connection between this 
project and Zimmermann’s. The first is that South African culture has been 
profoundly influenced by the West as a result of colonization, and by 
Christianity as a result of Christian missionary endeavour, not least the 
education of those cohorts of African leaders who established the African 
National Congress. In many respects they were Christian humanists in the 
sense described by Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and embodied in the likes of 
Albert Luthuli and Nelson Mandela. Their imprint on the Freedom Charter and 
our present Constitution is part of that humanist legacy, as is our Constitution. 
The second has to do with the extent to which Christianity in our context has 
lost its humanist thrust implicit, if not necessarily explicit, in Christology. The 
reasons are not unlike those in other contemporary societies dominated by 
fundamentalism and more susceptible to secularism than previously. So 
Zimmermann’s contribution to the debate, while centered on the West, 
resonates with the issues as I understand them in our own situation in important 
respects.  
 Heeding Heidegger’s injunction to critically retrieve tradition in order 
to transform the world, Zimmermann’s aim is neither to return to Christendom, 
within which Christianity attempts to reign supreme over culture, nor to 
resuscitate previous forms of Christian humanism. Instead, he goes behind 
modernity to explore the theological origins of humanism in the West with its 
foundations already laid in classical culture. Western humanism, he reminds 
us, is deeply rooted in the biblical assertion that humanity bears the ‘image of 
God’. The Patristic faith-claim that God becomes fully human in Christ in order 
that humans may become truly like God, and therefore truly human is 
foundational. So too, is the correlation of faith and reason, with faith being 
necessary for rationality and self-understanding. The result is ‘a profound 
sense of human dignity, solidarity, and freedom based on a reasonable faith’ 
(Zimmermann 2012a:87). 
 Scholastic humanism in the Middle Ages, Zimmermann observes 
going further, was built on and developed Patristic humanism in a way that 
some regard as ‘the most important kind of humanism Europe has ever 
produced’ (Zimmermann 2012b: 101), giving rise to modern science and then 
secular humanism. Unfortunately scholastic theology was incapable of keeping 
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pace with these developments, and not only became rigid but also fractured. It 
thereby undermined the synthesis of faith and reason which Renaissance 
humanism sought to affirm. That humanism, articulated in the work of 
Erasmus, the pre-eminent Christian humanist of his day, was more than the 
forerunner of a post-Enlightenment secular humanism; it was an attempt to 
recover the Christian humanism of the Patristic period which laid the 
foundation for Western culture as expressed in education, art and science. But 
already in the Renaissance the ontology which provided the basis for Christian 
humanism was being eroded from within until the synthesis between faith and 
reason, theology, philosophy and science, collapsed.  
 In a way that is reminiscent of some of Bonhoeffer’s key insights in 
his Letters and Papers from Prison (Bonhoeffer 2010: 475f), Zimmermann 
critically traces the development of post-Renaissance humanism from Vico 
through Schleiermacher to Dilthey, a gradual transition from ‘metaphysical to 
post-metaphysical humanism’ which leads to a rejection of humanism’s 
‘spiritual-theological foundations’ (Zimmermann 2012b: 150). This movement 
away from the Patristic tradition radically altered the basis on which Western 
cultural humanism has to be sustained, not just philosophically but in a world 
radically changed by historical developments and the dominance of empirical 
science. The inevitable result was the birth not just of secular humanism but 
also anti-humanism typified by Nietzsche and his nihilistic heirs which 
eventually found devastating expression in the Holocaust.  
 The hermeneutical task confronting us, then, is to re-articulate a 
religious humanist ethos and praxis based on the conviction that ‘this can 
renew Western identity and its zeal for knowledge subservient to the common 
good of a full humanity’ (Zimmermann 2012b: 317). This corresponds with 
Schweiker’s position and leads Zimmermann to a discussion of dominant 
strands in contemporary Islam which firmly reject Western secularism but 
seem unable to retrieve their own humanist tradition and avoid the dangers of 
fundamentalism. For Zimmermann, this needs to begin specifically with ‘the 
Judeo-Christian roots of values such as human dignity, freedom, hope and 
social responsibility’, in a way that enables both secular and other religious 
world views to ‘unite towards the common goal of becoming most fully 
human’ (Zimmermann 2012b: 318). But he is also aware of the need to engage 
Muslim scholars as well. This leads him to a discussion of contemporary Islam 
which firmly rejects Western secularism but is largely unable to retrieve its 
own humanist tradition and avoid the dangers of fundamentalism. Muslim and 
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Christian scholars, as well as those of other faith traditions, need to engage 
each other around these issues in order to generate a general humanist ethos 
capable of tackling the crisis in Western (and global) culture.  
 Critical towards this end is the reintegrating of faith and reason which 
takes us beyond the deconstruction of fideism and secularism to a widening of 
the concept of reason, an avoidance of fundamentalism, and a deepening of the 
meaning of faith. Three axioms should guide such mutual reflection. First, that 
self-knowledge or truth requires ethical transcendence; second, that such self-
knowledge is hermeneutical; and third, that it requires aesthetics. Certainly, 
without the recovery of some sense of transcendence the future of the 
humanities is unlikely, humanism itself beyond recovery, and the crisis in 
Western culture irresolvable (Schweiker 2010).  
 In response to this challenge, Zimmermann engages the work of key 
Western philosophers of recent times. Amongst them are Derrida, Lyotard, 
Kristeva, Kearney and Vattimo who provide insight though none is able to 
recover the synthesis between faith and reason of past tradition and therefore 
provide the philosophical basis for the recovery of Incarnational humanism 
today. More promising is Gadamer’s ‘hermeneutic humanism’, which 
recognizes religious dialogue as essential for the future of humanity, and of the 
renewal of the humanities as key to the renewal of culture, and Levinas’ 
‘humanism of the Other’ which provides the ‘most striking example of the need 
of incarnational theology’ (Zimmermann 2012b:216). What is needed, 
Zimmermann insists, is not just a ‘transcendental humanism’, but one which is 
incarnational, beyond dualism and rooted in historical experience. This brings 
Zimmermann to the theologians who are his chief interlocutors, Maurice 
Blondel and especially Bonhoeffer. What unites the Catholic philosopher and 
the Lutheran theologian is their affirmation of the Incarnation as the basis for 
correlating faith and reason, philosophy and theology, and therefore the unity 
of knowledge in the service of humanity. But it is Bonhoeffer’s Christological 
humanism that finally becomes the major resource for the recovery of Christian 
humanism for today for both Zimmermann and myself.  
 The recognition of Bonhoeffer as a Christian humanist is of seminal 
importance in my own work, though Zimmermann has examined his legacy 
more thoroughly within the broader narrative of Patristic humanism7. Bon-
hoeffer’s Christian humanism, Zimmermann writes: 
                                                          
7 See essays in Zimmermann and Gregor (2010). 
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points in the right direction: given that so much of our political and 
social problems are connected to the question of identity and religion, 
his emphasis on Christology and a new humanity provides arguably 
the best example of a religious humanism intrinsically able to open 
itself to reason, and to labour for the common good (Zimmermann 
2012b: 315). 
 
The ground is now prepared for me to re-engage Prozesky’s term ‘post-
ecclesiastical’, for Bonhoeffer’s Christology is ecclesiological at its core.  
 In his dissertation Sanctorum Communio Bonhoeffer boldly declared 
that ‘Christ exists as the church-community’ (Bonhoeffer 1998: 189ff). By this 
he was not referring to a particular ecclesiastical institution, but to that 
vicarious representative community in which Christ is present in the world as 
the beginning of a new humanity, or humanity restored. This was a constant 
theme throughout his theological development, until finally in his prison letters 
he spoke of ‘Jesus’s ‘being for others’ ‘as the experience of transcendence’, 
and as consequence, ‘the church is only the church when it is there for others’ 
(Bonhoeffer 2010: 499, 501). In other words, the character of the ecclesia is 
determined by the way it answers the question: ‘who is Jesus Christ for us 
today?’ How the church embodies that answer determines whether or not the 
church is faithful to the Jesus of history and the Christ it confesses in the creed. 
The birth of the new humanity in Christ crucified and risen is already a given. 
But the church as a sociological empirical reality only becomes the church as 
it conforms to his life, death and resurrection. This, for Bonhoeffer, radically 
changes the meaning of transcendence and of what ‘transcendental humanism’ 
(not that he used that term) should mean, namely ‘participating in this being of 
Jesus’ in ‘being there for others’ (Bonhoeffer 2010: 501). 
 If appropriated, incarnational humanism fundamentally reshapes the 
life of the church in the world today as a Eucharistic community in solidarity 
with the whole of humanity. To be the church can be nothing less. ‘Our current 
intellectual and cultural crisis’, Zimmermann writes, demands a sense of 
solidarity and common humanity that is intrinsic to the Christian faith’, and for 
this reason the church needs to recover ‘the early church’s spirit of passionate 
engagement with culture based on the mystery of the incarnation’ 
(Zimmermann 2012a: 324).  
 The ongoing struggle to establish communities in which the common 
good and the good of each is achieved, lies at the heart of what is meant by the 
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church as an agent of a new humanity. Understood in this way (though much 
in Christian practice contradicts it), the church is not a closed conglomerate of 
like-minded individuals or an institution in which individuals forfeit their 
personal being. Rather it is meant to be a community always in the process of 
formation in which human beings relate to each other beyond the divisions of 
race, class, culture, gender or sexual orientation, yet in ways that respect 
difference. As such the church should provide a model of reconciliation for the 
broader human community as well as a basis for solidarity in the struggle for a 
more just world. For the Christian humanist such a community is not closed or 
exclusive in character, but exists for and in solidarity with others. Only then is 
it faithful to the Jesus of history and the mythos that energizes those who 
believe he is the Christ.  
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